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IA5LF C? CONTENTS 
MITT CJ THE K/STUHJ C? THF CASE 
SITICII 5ELCW 
F 5CUGHT C£ APrJAL . . 
po\-J v \ 
M E ALJ AND COMMISSION ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IGNORED 
VIATIC VIOLATIONS OF THE APPELLANT"S CONSTITUTIONAL 
S AND RULES OF PROCEDURE DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE APPELLANT FROM 
5 HIS PROPERTY OR RESOURCES WITHOUT DUE PROCESS. "D&,-_=_ •, 
THE ALJ AND COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO DEFINE THE 
£ OF THE HEARING AND TO EXPLAIN WHY THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS 
IE SILER MATTER SHOULD BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE ALL OTHER INDIVIDUALS 
WHOM THE APPELLANT RAY HAVE HAD BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS, P P N C L ^ ^ 
Vx^\ /^  \ o 
THE ALJ AND COMMISSION STATE KANT ERRORS AS IF THEY WERE 
THUS THEIR CONCLUSIONS CANNOT BE VALID AND THEIR ARGUMENTS ARE 
T BASIS. ^ p v Q ^ 5 
nThe duty to determine the facts has been delegated to the 
The realistic interpretation of the facts and circumstances in evidence i 
essentail to the successful operation of thepidxr.'.-".". In its search for the 
ard has the rights to consider the interest of the witness (s); the probabil 
orbability of his insertions in liqht of proved or admitted facts; the 
1 sitation as shown by all the surrounding circumstances; the conditons 
which the witness acted and unde&which he testified; his prejudices, if any 
sire; his apparent forthrightness or lack thereof; and many other factors/ 
^ - A - W W . . . Y W . * * . ._ * . .%- W - . t J*J^ • - * ' , •*- ^ / / / ^ W « l 
, Ccnley vs . Crcwn Ccach Co. 3 ^ Kc, 123^ 159 T "•.". 2d ?.::' ?v« ^ r p 
. ^ci.cnaic vs . lunr: Construction Co. .:ennf i r f £,;?, (2) 517 19^5 
. Scmervilis v s . I n d u s t r i a l Ccisriiissicn cf Utah. 196 ?. (2) ? lc , 
? j " P*D-p.~""".*AT p r r ~ 
6-S-iCi 
6-:-51i 
— ** ~Z ' f" "T ~ • » " ™ i V - ' UTAH 
r L U U O r i l 
Plaint i f f /Appel lant f 
•?icy:-3,ir: SECURITY, CT CFCIL SI: 
•;ef endant s / .-.espor.a ent s 
,ase i\o, uCu^ 
PLAINTIFF PETTTICN ?C?. RFHFAHITG 
.his i s a p e t i t i o n by p l a in t i f f / appe l l an t , riichsra ,-toussy (hereinafter , 
Looeiieiant) controverting trie cec i s icn cf the ^carc of Review: ci --> a I ' / T I V C " " ) -
xm^issicn t h a t there was a conspiracy t o unlawfully ieau p witness by the 
industr ial Commission of Utah and forged exhibits by the Indus t r i a l Cc_rmissic 
;f Utah, and the I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah did i n s t ruc t Kr. S i le r t c perj 
dmself for monetary gain, 76-6-503, 76-5-101, 76-6-412, 76-8-414, 76-5-511, 
The I n d u s t r i a l Commission fo Utah a lso denied the p l a i n t i f f » . Huusay, 
:>. S i l e r s work records , Also the I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah hag never 
stated what was a t r i s k monetarily for >jr. Rcusay. 
Arguments of the plaintiff were heard by ALJ Kenneth A. Major. From 
i findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision of the Tribunal affirmi 
i Department's Decision Review Representative's decision, appellant filed a 
cion for review bv defendant/respondent Commission (hereinafter Commission). 
e Commission adopted the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the ALJ. 
.e Plaintiff herebv anneals from the decision regarding unemployment contribi 
.ability set forth by the Commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the Commission's affirmation 
of the ALJ!s findings of fact, conclusion of law and order, that the appe 
is liable for unemployment contributions for unemployment benefits to be 
paid to the claimant, Cecil P. Siler, or any other solicitors and delive 
(unidentified and un-named) ; and that the substance and validity of the 
independent contactor's agreement be held to be valid and sufficient~in 
holding its signatories not within the scope of the Utah Employment Sea 
Act, and that the appellant not be held to be an employer, and Chat-the 
Court issue an order barring further harrassment of the appellant by tt 
Employment Security Division. 
H E ALJ AND COMMISSION ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IGNORED 
LMAIIC VIOLATIONS OF THE APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL 
CS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE DESIGNED TO-PROTECT TEE APPELLANT FROM 
\G HIS PROPERTY OR RESOURCES WITHOUT DUE PROCESS. 
Mr. Rousay, the Appellant, is accused of being Mr. Siler!s 
Dyer. The allegation arises, according to the Statement of Facts, 
forms that Mr. Siler allegedly filled out, or which were completed 
lis. \ : L X ^ ^ > V - ^ 
Despite Mr. RousayTs efforts to clarify the independant 
ractor relationship with the Employment Security employees, they 
Evans in particular) continued to badger and harass Mr. Rousay 
Dut showing cause. 
when Mr. Rousay asked for a statement of the exact nature of the 
stigation of his private matters, Mr. Rousay was served with a 
Dena (Aug 10, 1984). Yet at no time was Mr. Rousay informed of his 
:s, warned of the possibility of self-incrimination, or told the 
it of penalties, charges, fees, or risk of imprisonment that might 
/e from the allegations. 
Mr. Pvousay has never been presented with a specific list of names 
Lleged employees for which he is being held liable for unemployment 
cibution. Mr. Rousay has never received a statement as to what is at 
in this process. Yet, the §tate was able to obtain subpoenas 
Dut specifying such details. Apparently, it is well within the authority 
le State to conduct a !lwitch hunt11. If a private citizen is suspected of 
Dying individuals, the State may require the individual to produce 
nents and evidence, and to be compelled to provide evidence against TneiA^ute 
Employment Security, the ALJ, and the Commission had the 
opportunity to subpoena other witnesses or individuals who were alleged 
:o have business relations with Mr. Rousay. Their names appear in the 
transcripts and the attachments thereto* Yet, the respondants failed to 
have them testify* Rather, it seems the respondents prefer to compel 
the only two witnesses in the case, Mr. Siler, and Mr. Rousay, to 
testify as the respondants would have them do. Despite ample 
statements and testomony that it was never the intention of either party 
of function ins an employer-employee relationship, and that they routinely 
reaffirmed that intention by signing affadavits to that effect, the 
ALJ and the Commission persisted in their Unsupported conclusions—and 
then broadened their conclusions to include persons they didn!t bother 
to have testify. 
z 
THE ALJ AND COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO DEFINE THE 
1C0PE OF THE HEARING AND TO EXPLAIN WHY THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS 
)F THE SILER MATTER SHOULD BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE ALL OTHER INDIVIDUALS 
JITH MOM THE APPELLANT MAY HAVE HAD BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS, 
The Statement of Fact clearly shows that Mr. Rousay had been 
round by the Employment Security Division to NOT be an employer of other 
individuals. Yet, without any explanation as to why there is any 
connection between Mr. Siler's case and any other potential applicant, 
the ALJ and Commission conclude that Mr. Rousay is an employer. 
2. 
This is patently absurd. Mr. Rousay cannot be both an employer 
ot an employer of the same person-or persons. Since he has already 
declared to be NOT an employer of Mr. Crabtree and others, Mr. Rousav 
t, therefore be their employer on the basis of a later hearing. This 
seems to have completely escaped the ALJ. 
The attorney for the respondent argues that because Mr.Rousar 
to meet the A B C test11 Mr. Siler was, therefore Mr. Rousay!s employee. 
re, however, is there an argument which explains why if Mr. Siler is 
found to be an employee of Mr. Rousay on the basis of the inform 
sented in this case why anyone else should be considered an employee. At 
point does the ALJ or the Commission make any effort to broaden the inquiry 
ond the specific facts of the Siler case. Yet, precipitously and without 
tification, the ALJ and the Commission broaden their conclusions 
apply to all other relationships, as if th& facts of the Siler lease were 
unique. 
Many statements in the transcripts point to the contrary. Mr. Sile 
.ationship with Mr. Rousay was unique. Not only was Mr. Siler coached in 
application, he was, of, those considered by the Commission, 
;t shown to be self-employed. Yet it is from this case that the ALJ and 
-mission wish to generalize! 
3 
It was alleg;ea that Mr. Siler delivered tickets orimarilv en 
lis own slaes, or when there xvas insufficient deliverymen to to make his 
deliveries, when Mr. Siler was -asked to estimate the amount of time he 
:ock in making those deliveries. The attorney for the respondent prompted 
iim. Mr. Siler later agreed that his estimate (which sounded very treeise) 
ras really aMwild guessn. 
In fact, the record shows that Mr. Siler spent 2-3 hours Der dav 
taking deliveries. If this were only seven to eight percent of his time, 
[r. Siler was working well over thirty hours per day. 
The truth is that Mr. Siler devoted a very high percentage of his 
;ime making deliveries, averaging 50-75 miles per day. As all deliveries 
rere made in residential areas, Mr. Siler wouldhave had to been a superior 
Lavigator, driven at excessive speeds and never tarried for more than a fews 
seconds at the door in order to have spent only 7 or 8 percent of his time 
_n delivery. 
This nonsensical acceptance of wild estimates on the part of the 
"ommission as "factual11 is evidence that the Commission is incompetent to cons 
:he evidence before them or so highly biased as to be willing to accept the 
1
 guided" utterances of a amnesiac as sufficient upon which to base their 
conclusions. This suggest that the Commission has little discernment as to 
:he what is. acceptable evidence. Heresay and wild guesses appear to .be fair 
THUS THEIR CONCLUSIONS CANNOT BE VALID AND THEIR ARGUMENTS ARE 
JT BASIS. 
"Mr. Siler performed all of his solicitation services an 
iaintiff's business with the exception cf a project involving 
of clam choder tickets.M 
The apparent intent of the statement is to imply that Mr. Siler did 
.e outside of Mr. Rousay!s office., which in turn implies control by 
:ous ay. 
In fact, the true nature of the relationship is just the opcsite. 
>iler requested to make calls from Mr. Rousay's office. 
MI made the calls there because it was more convenient.11 
Mr. Siler not only telephoned form his home, hired family 
r^s to help, distributed pamplets or flyers, and performed administrative 
Hions, at his home. 
"Mr. Siler, as did other solicitors, worked regular hours during a day 
vening shift.n This is patently false. Mr. Siler worked his own hours 
he came and went as he chose. The Commission offers no support for a 
lusion that others worked in regulated hours. Such as conclusion is 
warranted. In fact the Commission contradicts this statement by 
:luding t!,The plaintiff did not keep records of the hours worked or require 
solicotors to report a precise time by punching a time clock." The use 
:he word "precise" implies they may have had general requirements. This 
5 
3 required by other solicitors to be on hand when THEY wanted to use 
RousayTs office at THEIR convenience. 
me Utah Lmpiovment Security Act defines wages as "any remuneration f 
vices including commissions, bonuses, oiece rate, slary. etc.M The cuesticn 
ore the Court is not whether such "wages" were paid, but by whom, to whom-, 
for what services. 
Contrary to the implications of the reasonaine adopted bv the 
nissicn in this case, consenting adults enter into agreements on a routine 
is in the State of Utah in which -there is no perceived or intended 
ter-servant relationship. If you xvould believe the Commission there is 
7 one universe and that universe is made uo of two sets, employers and 
Lovees (masters, and servants). This world view is utterly inane. 
Tare are many transactions involving remuneration which have 
searing whatsoever on the concept of wages, and defined or intended uner 
Employment Security Act. Stock brokers buy and sell stock for their 
snts without every becoming employees. Carptenters, plumbers and 
sr tradesmen routinely perform services without becoming employees of 
general contractor. Librarians search for information! for library 
tons without becoming employees of the specific person who requests the 
Drmation. Bankers perform many services for their clients on a routine, 
i daily basis without ever becoming employees,, and are well-paid in the 
n of interest earnings for the trust placed in them. 
To ignore the thousands upon thousands of ad hoc joint ventures by 
Die who are linked often my TSEXE no more than a telephone line or a 
puter seems to beg the issue of employment altogether. Telecommunation 
come a wav or m e , tie or sne wno owns a teiepnone can be easily 
f employed as the delivery boy with a bicvcle, or the shoe shine 
th a box and a can of paste. Indeed, telemarketing is a multimiilion 
business and there is ample evidence to suggest that old definitions 
ace of employ" no longer apply. 
The appellant repeatedly suffered long delays between hearings, 
m was given only a short time to prepare for the specific allegaqtions 
Ln the hearings. 
while the hearing hotice gave the appellant adequate warning 
lest his witnesses j it was not until the final hearing before 
J that the issues of the case were clear. As Mr. Siler x^ as the only 
3 called by the Respondants or Mr. Rousay, the issues were only clear 
tfr. Siler had testified. 
The Court will note that Mr. Rousay requested a contunuance so 
i could bring witnesses in to controvert the opinions of Mr. Siler. 
is ay was not permitted to summon Wayne Clegg, but stipulated to the 
: of itfhat occured, only to qualify Mr. Rousay's testimony of what 
i by prefacing Mr. Rousay's account with supposedly'1. 
Moreover, Mr. Rousay has never been informed of what was at risk here. 
The Commission claims that "testimony clearly demonstrates the other 
luals contracintg with the plaintiff worked under identical contracts... 
:form their services in a similar manner to Mr. Siler.: 
If such a conclusion were true, how is it that Mr. siler could 
id fire others and not himself? Was everyone an office manager too? 
>ryone at some time in their relationship with Mr. Rousay function as 
7 
.liveryman cont actor, ueicp 
heir own T unit? The record indicates the opposite is true. While the 
ocumenT 2 other elements of the relationship were often the same, there 
,s f 1 * ^dence to support the Commissions conclusions that the relationships 
*ere essentially the same. 
It is allleged that MR. Siler functioned as an "office manager dui 
evening shift." The Commission failed to establish that Mr. Siler function* 
Ln this capacity because he hired and fired his own people and established 
:ontrol over them himself. 
The transcripts clearly show that there was not such a concept or 
thing as an evening shift as there was no time requirement for anyone to fun 
at a particular location at a specified time of day. Thus, Mr. SilerTs clai 
is clearly questionable. 
It is alleged that Mr. Siler received morezcompensation for 
his servces as manager for a period of !,two to three months". The compensa 
record, however, shows that Mr. Siler actually received less compensation t 
before. Mr. Siler stopped his personal production efforts or curtailed th 
to manage a larger prospecting effort. 
The record also shows tht Mr. Siler actually did the Lnterviewii 
and the firing of personnel both before and after the alleged date oi 
starting to function as manager or director of the employing unit* 
The Commission failed to demonstrate that the employing unit wa 
that of Mr. Rousay. Mr. Rousay did not hire and fire. Mr. Rousay merely 
programs, assisted the entrepreneur on request, and provided only those 
resources that the entrepreneur asked. Mr. Siler, however, declared hims 
8 
Jig unit. 
Mr. Rousay aia negotiate a larger percentage of the receipts 
:. Siler. This was done to permit Mr. Siler to develop an organization 
own. The fact that Mr. Siler did not perform telephone solicitn or 
ries for other businesses or for himself during the alleged period of 
lent is patently false. The record cl ear] y shows that Mr. Siler also 
1 as a driver for Ute Cab during this period of tine. The record also 
that Mr, Siler operated in a broad capacity as director of his own 
Lng unit during period in which he 1 s a"11 pQ-PH t n t is-7^ hoQT om^i ^ 0 ; 
THE ALJ AND THE COMMISSION HAVE DEMONSTRATED EXTREME 
ECE AND INSENSITIVITY TO MR. ROUSAY fS CIVIL RIGHTS, AND IN SO 
SAVE VIOLATED THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND DUE PROCESS, AND THERE 
3E CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION SHOULD BE OVERTURNED. 
rot ^rr 4j-
nThe duty to determine the facts has been delegated to the 
The realistic interpretation of the facts and circumstances in evidence 'is 
essentail to the successful operation of thep&&nr.--.7'. In its search for the 
ard has the rights to consider the interest of the witness(s); the probabili 
Drbability of his insertions In liqht of proved or admitted facts; the 
L sitation as shown by all the^surrounding circumstances; the conditons 
tfhich the witness acted and unde&which he testified; his prejudices, if any; 
sire; his apparent forthrightness or lack thereof; and many other factors." 
In the present case, Mr. Siler!s claim Is subject to denial 
is not supported by competent and substantial evidence and in the 
B of fraud, ... (emphasis mi ne.) 
The bi irden ] i es with the claimant to demonstrate that he Is entitle d 
benefits claimed. (Block vs. Kinder, 338 Mo. *099, 93 SV; 2c 932; 
vs. Crown Coach Company, 348 Mo. 1 2 ^
 ; ;,. . -: -bi, ^ c\) 
I n g e n e r a .1 t h e f I n d I n g s c • f f a c t: b y 11 I e C o mm I s s I o n s h a 1 ] t e 
sive and the j r i s d i c t i o n of the said court sha l l be confined to Questions 
law. However, as can be shown in this case, the facts presented as argumenr 
: the conclusions of the Commission are improbable ( reversal) Mr. 
Ler's willingness to engage in entrepreneurai activity, the single tiindec 
:ent cf the Employment Security to badger and harass Mr. Rousay (eventhough 
had been "acquitted" of employer status before), the extreme prejudice of 
Byrd and Mr. Evans in failing to exercise their due diligence to determine 
egibility, and failing to note the malleability of the claimant to 
ading and coaching during the application process and even during the 
amenation and cross examination. 
Of no less concern is the forging of Mr. Siler1s signature by 
. Evans on '*£)$£. only document submitted as a declarationof unemployment by 
s "employed status". Mr. Siler not only failed to demonstrate his 
egibility, the ALJ refused to permit such an examination on grounds it 
.s not relevant to Mr. RousayTs alleged liability for unemployment ccntributic 
The charter of the ALJ is to get at the truth. This supposes that 
le ALJ will consider facts and arguments on BOTH sides of an issue. There 
i no evidence in the finds of fact that the ALJ made any effort to 
ibpoena the personal records or documents of Mr. Siler, verify his eligibility 
r challenge the information presented on his application for benefits. Yet, 
le ALJ seems willing to overlook the badgering, harrassment, and annoyance 
t the appellant, eventhough the appellant had been found not an employer 
i previous occasions. 
If the Court should rule against the appellant, the Court would 
et a precedent with dire consequences. Not only would this case serve 
o warrant a reckless and wanton abuse of investigative authority and 
owers of the Industrial Commission, but it would undermine the obligation 
1 their responsibility of objectively examining both sides of an 
to get an the truth. 
For example, the ALJ, in his findings of fact, and conclusions of 
d order, offered no explanation for rejecting Mr. PvousayTs explanation 
relationship, and yet under cross examination, tha t not only is 
t 9 signed by someone other than the applicant, but that the applicant 
es every statement on the form. This implies undue influence on Mr. 
This reasonable conclusion seems to have slipped by the ALJ. No 
able or prudent individual would fail to take note of questionable 
validity c: £212 Sixer's eligibility. Yet the ALJ patently 
es Mr. Sile- !- e~:_-;,-: :' : - •- r.ny . .-. _-c, r_, and 
s to pursue the matter further! 
This is a patent violation of his charter to examine such issues, 
si der the va] i dity of evidence, and to challenge" sour ces of information. 
only failed to examine, he seems to take a proactive role in getting 
Dnable evidence into the r e c o r d He asserts that- he will take such 
*s into consi derati on, bi it i n tl le cone] usions of 1 aw and order, 
I to note — e v e n mention in passing—this central issue in his 
lent. 
Sommerville, vs Industrial Commission, Utah, (196 P. (2) 71S H 9 4 8 ) , 
ipreme Court held that a map, injure,: while attempting to repair 
ib.. i- : c. *offte .-.v: . ....:.:.= . to compensation (though he 
emp loyee and not an in depend en t contract o r) s i n c e h i s w o r k w a s h e J c 
outside the usual trade, business, or occupation of his employer. 
iplovee was not considered within the nrotection of the Act because 
e nature of the work, he engaged in was not sufficiently "parallel" 
the general nature of the work performed by the usual employees of 
.e coffee shop. 
The distinction between casual and usual employment is made in 
in Mc Donald v. Dunn Construction Co., Tenn. 185 S. W. (2) 
,7 (1945). In Mc Donald v. Dunn, the Court held that an employee 
is not. "casual" if the work he performed wre in the usual course of 
rade, business, profession or occupation of his employer. By this 
itionale, then, the individual who engages in functions, or activities 
lich resemble , or parallel his former occupation or career, he wold 
i easily perceived to engage in ninon-casualn or his "usual" type 
f employment. 
Mr. Siler was a vehicle driver. Based on his employment record 
\-* v-U (b*T \D ), Mr. Siler usually engaged in the business of 
elivery or vehicle driving for compensation or hire. It was his 
sual activity or work to perform such activities as moving cargo or 
aking deliveries. In .this sense, his certainly within his usual 
ype of work. He, in fact, maintained an Chauffeur D license which 
ermitted him to operate vehicles of virtually unlimited size (except 
hose requiring special permits suchas school buses). At it would 
urprise no one who knew him to see that upon self-termination he 
aediately went to work as a Cab Driver. Thus, there is a consistent pattern 
it Mr. Siler, as a self-employed, independent contractor, continued to 
iction in his usual business or carerr, or trade as a vehicle operator, 
is point was glossed-over by the Commission in their ruling. 
\2_ 
Commission argues that he had never performed such work before, and 
efore, his functioning as a solicitor was not in the usual course of 
work. 
Since the activity of solicitation was in no way similar 
peating a vehicle, such activity, was therefore, non-traditional 
Linusai for him, and therefore, he is regarded to be an employee—not 
operating or managing 
e of an established, independent business as an independent contractor, 
therefore must be considered more an employee skasxs self-employed. 
Here again, the Commission lost sight of the central issue. 
is declared intention of becoming a telephone solicitor, and by his 
ging in entrepreneurial activities associated with this solicitation, 
as, ]'} wertheless
 ? self-employed. There is a clear precedent for this 
of radical change in an individual's life. It Is not unusal for 
ons to make abrupt career changes when they feel they can no longer 
their perbcnai goals in onier forms of employemtn. 
When Mr. Slier approached Mr. Rousay for a:; cr>?rr—\- '* 
tion as a self-employed, independent contractor, and indicated 
'was his declared Intent, ( \ix\o» ^ ":>) > Mr. S: ler became, no longer 
ly a vehicle operator. He crossed the line from servant, and employee 
thers, to master and eventually, employer of others. Within a fewT 
t months Mr. Slier established himself to be a capable, i f not 
ly successful manager *: h. «w nip] oyi ng i mi 1: He negoti ated hi s 
level of Income ( V ; ' ~ negotiated for <:;:: increase percentage 
tie business ( i=-xi» \ I::> i ** •: ..,.- .urea ana iii. :• others as an employer. 
\3 
, -. . _. .,v^r» a n maiviaua± oecomes an inaenenaent: by cei in it ion, wtien 
itractor, and behaves with autonomy as a self-employed manager of 
3 won employing unit, he cannot be held to be "within" the usual 
ade, or career or activity, or occupation of another business associate 
cause, as self-employed, he cannot be employed by another. Since he 
anot be employed by another, he cannot be construed to be "within" 
e usual function of another. 
Since he was not within the "business" of Mr. Pvousay, he cannon 
considered to be an employee of Mr. Rous ay from the standpoint of 
egible for benefits. Just as the Supreme Court held that the man 
jured in the rpair of a gable at the coffee shop where he was employed, 
was nevertheless, not compensated, because his activities were outside 
e usual function of his duty to someone else. In essence, the Court 
led he was "doing his own thing." 
In the same sense, Mr. Siler, eventhough he is adjudged to 
an "employee" because he is not and "independnet contractor" (fallacious 
still 
gument) Mr. Siler would not be qulified as a claimant for unemployment 
nefits, because, by his own declared intent, he had decided to do his 
wn thing." (£XHI6»» \*>) . In light of the Court's findings in 
mmerville, therfore, Mr. Siler should have never been granted benefits 
d this case should have never come before the Court. The Commission 
red in failing to understand the reasoning ofthe Court in this matter 
d seems to have an understanding outside the context of case law. 
The reason the Commission seems to miss these central points 
.g. Mr. Siler!s declared self intent to be an indpenent contractor, 
:unctioning as an entrepreneur, his self-employment, his never 
lg n.;"-iwe to Mr. Rousay of 1 lis termination) is that they are seemingl 
:cupied with "making their case" against Mi :. Roi isay—i lot in ex ami ning 
: acceptance of liability for Mr. Siler's claim. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that Mr. Siier's excursion 
telephone solicitation was not within his usual course of business 
reer, and therefore, the period for which he claimed unemployment 
its is not compensable under the Employment Security Act, because the 
hone solicitation was "casual" according to definitions put forth 
ling on Mc Donald v. Dunn, and Sommerville V. the INdustrial Commission. 
sence, the Commission fails to make its argument in either case. It 
rfectly clear from the findings of fact that the claimant changed 
sual pattern of employment as a v^h::'!e "~r = -**-. ond declaring 
ntent to be an independent contractor, engaged in entrepreneural 
ity, free from the control <. : the Appellant. When this entrepreneurial 
re failed to pan ci it f or Mr. S1 1 eer, 1 le simply 'walked away. Theref u: e 
ssociation with Mr. Rousay was both "casual" and non-compensable in 
ramework of the Employment Security Act. 
Benefits should never have been, granted Mr. Siler. The efforts 
Id Mr. Rousay liable for unemployment compensation should therefore 
uncated, as it has in the past in other hearings and Mr, Rousay 
d be p^ r.-iL". - > uii abn . . .^.siness and providing lor ;ns 
y without the incessant badgering of the Einp] oyment Sea rri ty Di vision. 
I 5 
"he ruling cf the Industrial Commission should be reversec a no all 
actions against Mr. Rcusay cismissed. 
State Officials have ccschec the only witness, colluded in preparing 
what appears tc be a fraudulent application (76-6-503. 76-S-1C1, 76-5-412. 
76-S-^i^, 76-5-511.) ana brca.cened Siler's case (which is unique by aLr.cs" 
any legal stancaru) tc include ether allegea (un-nair.ee employees). 
"When the State cia present its argument that Mr. Rcussy was an employ* 
Kr. Rcusay was uenieu the opportunity to subpoena records and witnesses 
Cne of the points plaintiff raises on appeal is that his due process 
rishts "were violated when the administrative Lsw judge at the hearing 
belcw refused plaintiff's right to call witnesses cf his own. Specificaii 
the administrative law jucge refused to issue subpoena requiring the atxer 
cf Wavne Cleeg, an employee cf the Industrial Commission. Although defenc 
brief states that "Mr. Clegg had no know ledge cf facts which were materia, 
to the issues of the case,,; the reccrc Indicate otherwise. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-4--11 (197^ &Supp. 1987), The 
Industrial Commission is charged with the duty 'to administer the Fmployme 
Security Act, and in light of such and under the facts of this case, the 
administrative law judge erred in precluding testimony and record evidenc 
regarding Clegg1s conduct and involvement in the case. 
To rule against Kr. Rousay would establish a shocking precedent of 
setting aside contracts between two consenting adults, who by agreement ; 
mutually at risk, who declare themselves to be independent contractors, 
furthermore,.the State would condone the violation of private businessme 
permit the harassment of individuals, and deny them Constitutional rio-ht 
5 S t a i e would n i s ^ i 'x t ip \,L <;cac::i::j ci w i t n e s s e s t •permit q u e s t i o n a b l e 
mments t o admit ted as E x h i b i t s , ( E x h i b i t 9 ) . 
Theugh S t a t e O f f i c i a l s would no- al low Yr. S i i e r : o f u l l r ecord t o be 
DDoenaei:, arid ot::e.r w i t n e s s e s t o t e s t i f y en v r , r , c i5^^ r s behalf , t h e 
mscr i r r t s c l e a r l y n o i n t tr.n- v ^ -: :;_-•• - -- ••-.:. --/::; j.<v/r< -•.•?.. . enrolover, 
i t h e r e f o r e could not be employee. Since he ccuic ne t be employee, :: s 
.
 n 9 v e r e l i g i b l e fo r unemployment b e n e f i t s . Sines S l i e r was never e l i g i b l e , 
>se a c t i o n s Fue::- „ - . - . - - . . •- ; :_:\ . .- r"\ 
The fact that they h?ve, witn zuc;: ea_j.cus disregard for Mr. ?„eussyfs 
hts, clearly shews an attitude so arbitrary ana capricious ?s to be 
iber-^-e harassment, ' •' • • 
The conclusion of the Industrial Commissien should reversed sne all 
ions against Kr. Rcusay should be dismissed immediately so that he 
irarci- . remedy sgams": t:icse *i u n 7e so brazenly wronged him. 
pectiuiiy submitted this 6th day of January, 1988. 
Richard RCIUSP,/ 
Pro Se 
/ 
